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Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome' »

Source: Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Volume/Issue: 1999/100

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 1999

ISBN: 9781451852387

Keywords: Banking Crises, Capital Account Liberalization, Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, international capital, deposit rates, international capital markets

The removal of government guarantees in borrowing countries does not eliminate the moral hazard problem posed by the existence of deposit guarantees in lender countries. The paper shows that, after restrictions on...

Deviations From Uncovered Interest Parity
			: A Global Guide to Where the Action Is

Deviations From Uncovered Interest Parity : A Global Guide to Where the Action Is »

Volume/Issue: 1998/117

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Evan Tanner

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 August 1998

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451941647.001

ISBN: 9781451941647

Keywords: exchange rate, real exchange rate, inflation, exchange rates, real exchange rates

Ex-post deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) – realized differences between dollar returns on identical assets of different currencies – equal the real interest differential plus real excha...

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome' »

Volume/Issue: 1999/100

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 1999

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451852387.001

ISBN: 9781451852387

Keywords: Banking Crises, Capital Account Liberalization, Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, international capital, deposit rates, international capital markets

The removal of government guarantees in borrowing countries does not eliminate the moral hazard problem posed by the existence of deposit guarantees in lender countries. The paper shows that, after restrictions on...